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Abstract: Despite 40 years of equal opportunities policies and more than two decades of 
government and organization initiatives aimed at helping women reach the upper echelons of 
the corporate world, women are seriously underrepresented on corporate boards. Recently, 
fifteen countries sought to redress this imbalance by introducing gender quotas for board 
representation. The introduction of board gender quota legislation creates ethical tensions and 
dilemmas which we categorize in terms of motivations, legitimacy, and outcomes. We 
investigate these tensions through four overarching theoretical perspectives: institutional, 
stakeholder, social identity, and social capital. We outline a future research agenda based on 
how these tensions offer greater focus to research on quotas and more broadly to ethics and 
diversity in organizations in terms of theory, anticipated ethical tensions, data, and 
methodology. In sum, our review seeks to synthesize existing multidisciplinary research and 
stimulate future enquiry on this expanding set of legislation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Boardroom gender diversity is a contemporary ethical issue for companies as senior level 
diversity contributes significantly to embedding a strong ethical culture (Institute of Business 
Ethics, 2011; Carrasco, Francour, Labelle, Laffarga & Ruiz-Barbadillo, 2015). Women’s 
under-representation in positions of economic power encompasses issues around affirmative 
action (Bacchi, 1996), corporate governance (Collier & Roberts, 2001; Arnold, 2012), and 
gender (Robin & Babin, 1997; White, 1992). Around the world, women face significant 
career progression barriers (Karam & Jamali, 2013), particularly to the highest echelon: 
corporate board directorships. In the U.S., sex segregation patterns in corporate boards are 
unlikely to change dramatically through organic processes (Kogut, Colomer, & Belinky, 
2014). Many developed countries’ female board directorship shares have stagnated at or 
below 15% (Catalyst, 2015), reflecting strong homophily preferences in board appointments 
(Westphal & Milton, 2000) and the relatively few female corporate leaders as symbolic token 
gender representatives (Kanter, 1977). The persistent gender inequality in the upper echelons 
is surprising as women consistently outnumber men in degree programs, and achieve higher 
academic performance (OECD, 2015). 
The ample supply of female talent implies a demand-led problem (Gabaldon et al., 
2015), suggesting ethics scholars examine power inequalities relative to qualifications. This 
approach inevitably leads to questions regarding the social equality of women and the role of 
business (Albrecht, 2003) and organizations’ political and social mandates (Scherer, Palazzo 
& Matten, 2009; Doh, 2012). The growing evidence that gender-balanced boardrooms are 
better governed (Ferreira, 2015) encourages business ethics scholars to investigate both the 
causes of and potential solutions to persistently low numbers of women directors.  
There is a controversial solution that addresses the ethical issue of gender inequality 
in boards: a gender boardroom director quota (hereinafter quota). The first quota was 
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announced in Norway in November 2002, and mandated at least 40% director representation 
from each gender. Subsequently, fourteen countries established quotas, and seventeen 
countries instituted voluntary codes for female representation on boards (Terjesen, Aguilera, 
& Lorenz, 2015; see Appendix A). The Norwegian quota is described as a “snowball” 
(Machold et al., 2013) gathering momentum that some feel as a “threatening avalanche… 
mobilizing ideological and political resistance” (Huse & Seierstad, 2013:38) and has led to a 
“fast changing” global landscape of quotas (Seierstad, Warner-Søderholm, Torchia, & Huse, 
2015). Business ethics scholars can utilize a number of perspectives to question, support, and 
refute quotas such as examining whether quotas are undemocratic (Dubbink, 2005) and 
discriminatory (Gopalan & Watson, 2015). Quotas are described as a rational “last response” 
to an intractable problem (Fagan & González Menéndez, 2012); however, as O’Connell, 
Stephens, Betz, Shepard, and Hendry (2005: 94) explain, “to describe an organizational 
practice as rational, one must first ask for whom the practice is rational.” 
Driven by ethical concerns and considerations, the goal of our paper is to review the 
extant literature, enlightening and advancing theoretical debates for or against quotas, and 
outline an agenda for the future. In so doing, we take stock of the recent burgeoning of 
academic literature which is mostly descriptive and sometimes offers conflicting evidence. 
From a business perspective, the quota is a radical change agenda which is often 
misconstrued and ill-informed, invoking emotional rather than rational responses. Taken 
together, there are many ethical issues surrounding quotas which deserve attention. We 
systematically collected, read, and analyzed all published and in-press articles about quotas. 
This process involved using search terms such as quota*, affirmative action, female director* 
on Business Source Premier, JSTOR, ProQuest, GoogleScholar, and other databases. These 
terms led us to a variety of journal and book publications in a diverse set of fields including 
ethics, law, management, psychology, and other areas. We also contacted 50 scholars who are 
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interested in quotas and women on boards to obtain their forthcoming research. In total, we 
reviewed more than 120 articles, book chapters, working papers, white papers, and other 
publications. 
We begin by describing how ethical concerns about quotas are best explored in 
relation to three considerations: motivations, legitimacy, and outcomes. We answer calls for 
more theoretical perspectives on women on boards (Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh, 2009) by 
analyzing these tensions through four different theoretical perspectives: institutional, 
stakeholder, social capital, and social identity. Institutional theory explores the relationships 
between organizations and their environments at industry and societal levels, examining how 
normative behavior patterns are maintained and sometimes change (North, 1990; Scott, 
1995). Stakeholder theory is concerned with how stakeholders exert influence or are 
influenced by organizations’ activities (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Social identity theory 
considers intra- and inter-group relations and the dynamics of diversity in terms of social 
comparisons between ‘ingroups’ and ‘outgroups’ that order the social environment (Ashforth 
& Mael, 1989; Kanter, 1977; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). It explains how the dominant group 
allows a few ‘other’ individuals to be ‘cherry picked’ and let through to the upper echelons 
(Haslam, 2004). Social capital theory explores how individuals access resources through their 
networks to others (Coleman, 1988). We then offer a future research agenda incorporating 
theory, anticipated ethical tensions, data, and methodology. Taken together, our research 
offers new theoretical insights into board gender quotas, implications for practice and policy, 
and a focus for future research. 
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
As context is critical (Johns, 2006), we review the history of the first quota in Norway and 
the subsequent legislation around the world. Although academics generally agree that the 
status quo of gender inequality in the corporate upper echelon is unacceptable, there is 
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considerable disagreement regarding whether quotas are the best approach (Choudhury, 
2015; Gopalan & Watson, 2015; Holts & Kirsch, 2015; Szydlo, 2015; Engelstad & Teigen, 
2002; Foust-Cummings, 2013). This historical overview illustrates ethical pressures and 
contradictions which we subsequently discuss in terms of tensions and theories. 
In February 2002, the white conservative male Norwegian Minister of Trade and 
Industry [hereinafter Minister] Ansgar Gabrielsen called journalists to his home for a 
‘surprise announcement.’ Minister Gabrielsen shocked most of the country, including his 
cabinet colleagues, by declaring that Norway would introduce a 40% gender quota for boards 
of publicly traded firms and state-owned enterprises. The announcement was the first of its 
kind in the world – a government forcing businesses to ensure gender balance in boardrooms. 
Prior to the quota, Norway’s share of female directors languished at 10%, despite a myriad of 
government initiatives such as women’s networks, mentoring, training, databases, and law 
hearings (Huse, 2013a, Strøm, 2015). Norwegian companies not in compliance faced 
dissolution and de-listing from the Oslo Stock Exchange. Despite initial and vehement 
opposition by many groups, all Norwegian listed companies achieved 40% female 
representation by mid-2008 (Bergstø, 2013). 
Minister Gabrielsen’s announcement also surprised the rest of the world. Although 
Scandinavian countries are renowned for egalitarian approaches, a quota for the business 
world was revolutionary. Five years later in 2007, Spain’s left-leaning government coalition 
announced a 40% quota by 2015 for publicly-traded firms with more than 250 employees, 
despite resistance from many organizations and individuals. The Spanish quota does not 
penalize non-compliance, instead offering incentives for state contracts for complying 
companies. The Spanish quota faced strong resistance, with less than half of targeted 
companies complying (Cabo, Terjesen, Gimeno, & Escot, 2015). Iceland’s devastating 
economic crisis in late 2008 was largely attributed to the actions of men running Iceland’s 
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largest banks (Arnórsdóttir, 2012; Arnardóttir & Sigurjonsson, 2014; Sigurjonsson, 
Arnardóttir, Vaiman, & Rikhardsson, 2015; Vaiman, Sigurjonsson, & Davidsson, 2011), and 
led to calls for more female representation on corporate boards. In March 2010, Iceland 
adopted a 40% quota for firms with more than 50 employees, and all firms complied by the 
September 2013 deadline. In early 2011, France legislated a quota of 20% by 2014 and 40% 
by 2018 including sanctions for non-compliance: no fees for individual corporate directors. 
France appears to be close to meeting the target. Malaysia, Italy, and Belgium followed suit 
in June 2011, by introducing 20%, 33%, and 33% quotas respectively. Italy’s quota requires 
20% women by 2012 and threatens fines and directors losing offices (Brogi, 2013). 
Belgium’s sanctions are harsher, and include voiding the appointments of directors who do 
not conform to the board quota and suspending director benefits. India (2012) and the UAE 
(2013) set a quota for one woman on each board; however, there is little reporting or 
enforcement. The large and somewhat autonomous regions of Québec (Canada) and 
Greenland (Denmark) established 50% quotas in 2006 and 2013 respectively. In November 
2014, German Chancellor Angela Merkel introduced a 30% quota for Germany’s largest 
public companies, with a sanction that the director seat must be left vacant.  
This historical overview illustrates that although countries have different board gender 
quota models, one unifying characteristic is the conflicting tensions that surface. Individuals, 
organizations, governments, and societies have differing, often juxtaposed, rationales and 
logics which subsequently create ethical tensions for organizations and their leaders. 
Although some scholars implicitly address how quotas create tensions (e.g., Machold et al., 
2013), there is no systematic attempt to describe and categorize these tensions. To review the 
literature on quotas, we follow Smith, Gonin, and Besharov (2013) in identifying three key 
tensions in how quotas are discussed and (re)presented: the motivations for quotas, including 
political ideologies; legitimacy in terms of meritocracy and ethics; and outcomes of 
8 
 
implementing quotas for society, organizations, and individuals; and draw on four theoretical 
perspectives: institutional, stakeholder, social identity, and social capital. Table 1 depicts the 
framework. 
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------- 
 
CONFLICTING TENSIONS CONCERNING BOARD GENDER QUOTAS 
Motivations for Adopting Board Gender Quotas: Ethical Tensions 
Motivation tensions concern the underlying rationale for quotas, and stem from a range of 
strategic and emotive concerns. A review of the quota literature suggests three main questions 
arise around the motivations for quotas: desires for justice and utility, countries’ underlying 
institutional structures, and the pursuit of integrity or compliance. 
 
Are quotas motivated by a desire for utility or justice? The two most frequently mentioned 
rationales for implementing quotas are utility and justice. The utility case seeks to achieve the 
most economically satisfying outcome, either for society or an organization (often referred to 
as “the business case”). The justice case argues for individual and social equality. These 
perspectives are anchored in contested political ideologies about capitalism and individualism 
versus state intervention and the role of business in society. Interestingly, utility and justice 
arguments are employed to argue both for and against quotas (Tienari, Holgersson, 
Merilainen, & Hook, 2009). For example, utility perspectives emphasize capitalism and 
individualism in that firms should be free to select the most qualified individual to lead the 
firm. The utility lens is buoyed by findings that indicate that quotas help to effectively 
leverage female talent (Tatli, Vassilopoulou, & Özbilgin, 2013), and moreover that women 
directors bring fresh perspectives (Francoeur, Labelle, & Sinclair-Desgagné, 2008), greater 
attention to corporate governance (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Pathan & Faff, 2013), and active 
levels of participation (Virtanen, 2012; Bilimoria & Wheeler, 2000; Ingley & Van der Walt, 
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2003) and monitoring (Post & Byron, 2015) to their boards. Another illustration of the utility 
perspective is former EU Justice Commissioner Vivian Reding’s (2012, 2013) contention that 
quotas will enhance Europe’s economic growth. Quota opponents use the justice rationale to 
argue that the most qualified individual should have an opportunity to be a board member. 
Quota proponents leverage justice to suggest that all demographic groups should be 
represented equally, e.g., women comprise half the population and therefore should hold half 
the power (Dahlerup, 2002). 
In Norway, one might assume that the quota was uncontested given the country’s long 
history of political quotas and other initiatives for women; however, the debate was 
extremely polarized between quota opponents (most industrialists) and supporters (most 
media and politicians) (Storvik & Teigen, 2010; Teigen, 2011, 2012), with both sides using 
justice and utility arguments. The anti-quota industrialists emphasized the competitive 
landscape and the need for Norwegian businesses to choose their own leaders, and the belief 
that nothing hinders women’s careers (Meier, 2013). Leaders at Norway’s confederation of 
business enterprises argued that the quota would reduce Norwegian firm competitiveness and 
performance (Hoel, 2008)— a rationale later used by Spanish and German business 
communities when quotas were suggested (González Menéndez & Martínez González, 2012; 
Smith, 2014).  
At an organizational level, utility motivations rest on the ‘business case’ for women 
on boards; however, there is conflict as to which ‘case’ merits primary focus, and how the 
business case should be measured. Business case arguments revolve around talent 
management, creativity, innovation, decision-making, risk, stakeholder relationships, 
customers, and/or financial performance; however, for all criteria, there is mixed evidence 
regarding the impact of women directors (Terjesen et al., 2009). Neoliberal capitalists argue 
that market forces will ensure whether having more women directors is really benefic ial to 
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the business, and that quotas are inconsistent with Anglo-American market discourse (Tienari 
et al., 2009). In the UK, quota supporters use the talent maximization argument to indicate 
that there is a market failure which justifies intervention (Mayhew, 2013). A quota is more 
likely to be successful when it is supported by business and wider society, as is the case for 
utility-based rather than social or individual justice arguments (Seierstad et al., 2015). There 
are ethical tensions surrounding the cost/benefit analysis of the cost to organizations to 
implement a quota relative to the social benefit: an “ideological debate between social justice 
and the protection of ownership and its attached right to govern the disposition of assets 
unencumbered by political intervention” (Kogut et al., 2014: 891). When organizations are 
responsible for social change, there is an ethical need to scrutinize the outcomes and 
processes of their involvement (Banerjee, 2010). 
The logics of social justice and utility are each supported by distinct institutional 
structures. Distinct logics can cause tensions, but can also be advantageous as diverse 
perspectives give leaders greater latitude to develop creative solutions (Seo & Creed, 2002). 
The competing motivation logics of justice versus equality are visible in Norway between 
Trade Minister Gabrielsen and Arni Hole (Director General, Ministry of Children, Equality 
and Social Inclusion) who both championed the quota. In the UK, to avoid a potential quota, 
the Business Innovation and Skills department and the Government Equalities Office initially 
worked together, despite competing motivations.  
 
What institutional structures motivate quotas? A growing literature utilizing institutional 
theory offers insights into the tensions of motivations for quotas through the mechanisms of 
normative contagion and mimetic and coercive pressures. Institutional pressures operate 
across groups of organizations (e.g., firms listed on a particular stock exchange), sectors (e.g., 
from politics to business), and countries (e.g., across Europe and the global board quota 
debate). Interventions are far more common in public than in private spheres: nearly half the 
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world’s countries have a quota in a political or state-owned sphere (Dahlerup & Freidenvall, 
2005; Dahlerup, 2013, 2015). Quotas spread from the political to the economic sphere in 
Norway (Teigen, 2012a), Latin America (Meier, 2013), and elsewhere. Of the Belgian quota, 
Meier (2013:463) explains: “Once a norm has been established with respect to gender 
equality, it is difficult to set a completely different one, even in another sector.” Historical 
institutional perspectives describe gradual and congruent interactions and trajectories 
(Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Teigen, 2012a). Three country-level institutions precede quotas: 
“the female labor market and gendered welfare policies, left-leaning government coalitions, 
and a legacy of path dependent gender equality initiatives in public policy and corporate 
governance codes” (Terjesen et al., 2015: 233). Countries with quotas have institutions 
aligned with mixed market economies (i.e., France, Italy, Spain) or coordinated market 
economies (i.e., Belgium, Finland, Norway), and legal systems of Scandinavian (i.e., Finland, 
Iceland, Norway) or French (i.e., Belgium, France, Italy, Spain) origin (Machold & Hansen, 
2013).  
Another institutional structure driving quotas are efforts to develop and maintain 
national identity which often draw on public opinion. Norway’s historical ideology of gender 
equality (Freidenvall, Dahlerup, & Skjeie, 2006) motivated quota debates (Sørensen, 2013) as 
Minister Gabrielsen described the wasted money society spends on educating its daughters 
but then not allowing them to fulfill their potential. Another illustration of the powerful 
institution of national identity is Brazil’s longstanding multi-racial population who take great 
pride in the country’s “racial democracy” and the national discourse of “a multi-colored 
national race” rather than one race (Htun, 2004: 61). Concerned with the grossly apparent 
inequalities when he came to power in 1995, then President Fernando Frederique Cardoso 
openly questioned the country’s self-identity and subsequently introduced quotas for blacks, 
women, and the disabled.  
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The institutional manifestations of gendered work, including the low representation of 
women’s talent in the upper echelons, can also be examined through Kanter’s (1977) theory 
of homophily. Based on social identity theory, ingroup and outgroup dynamics explain how 
individuals feel more comfortable around, and are better able to understand and recognize 
similar others’ talents, competences, and potential (O’Reilly, Caldwell, & Barnett, 1989). 
Homosocial reproduction processes suggest that leaders recruit individuals who are similar to 
themselves, and interventions are necessary to rectify the homophily-driven replication of the 
status quo. 
 
Are efforts to add women to the board motivated by considerations of integrity or 
compliance?  
A controversial new regulation such as the quota can raise concerns about whether the goal is 
integrity in the sense of meeting the spirit of the new law or considerations of compliance, 
responding more to the letter of the law. Institutional theory offers insights into why this 
question is important given the ways in which organizations respond to institutional pressures 
– at times emphasizing symbolic responsiveness (i.e., the notion of decoupling highlighted by 
theorists going back to DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) and at times more substantive 
responsiveness (see Selznick, 1994). Agency and interests are central to institutional 
processes (DiMaggio, 1988) which are subject to individuals’ self-interest, and bounded by 
norms of fairness and reciprocity (Bosse & Phillips, 2015). In Norway, 
extensive normative pressures such as mentoring, training, databases, and law hearings did 
not substantially improve shares of women on boards (Huse, 2013a). However in France, the 
largest CAC40 firms implemented the greatest post-quota improvements (Singh, Point & 
Moulin, 2015). The coercive pressure of the ‘threat of quota’ increased shares of women on 
boards in the UK and Australia (Klettner, Clarke, & Boersma, 2014; Sheridan, Ross-Smith, & 
Lord, 2014; Vinnicombe, Doldor, Sealy, Pryce & Turner, 2015). 
13 
 
Organizations utilize five different strategies to address competing institutional 
demands: acquiesce, comply, defy, avoid, and manipulate (Pache & Santos, 2010). 
Approximately half of the Spanish companies defy the law by simply ignoring it. In Norway 
and Iceland, most firms acquiesce and comply; a handful of Norwegian firms avoided the law 
by changing their listed status (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Bøhren & Staubo, 2014). The UK 
government strategy avoids the threat of an EU law by addressing the issue pre-law at a 
national level. Some French companies manipulate the law by placing celebrity female 
directors (Branson, 2012a).  
Tensions of integrity versus compliance are driven by intentions of action. Norwegian 
proponents justify the quota in terms of utility of female talent, with the hope of improving 
female participation rates across the entire workforce. Subsequent EU countries’ (e.g., Italy) 
quotas are often ascribed to mimetic compliance pressures to gain legitimacy. At an 
organizational level, some British firms provide board diversity statements of intent to avoid 
negative media attention as such attention is a mechanism for social change (Vasi & King, 
2012). However, “even ceremonial adoption can unintentionally trigger a chain of reactions 
that have real organizational effects” (Bromley & Powell, 2012). UK FTSE Chairs report 
initially agreeing to increase female board representation to meet normative expectations, and 
soon realize the real changes and benefits of female directors (Vinnicombe et al., 2015).  
Another tension concerns whether regulations on counting and reporting the numbers 
of women lead to substantive or only symbolic change. Governance regulation on reporting 
can help to achieve stakeholder accountability (Hess, 2007), as demonstrated in Australia and 
the UK’s new gender-metric reporting regulations at board, senior management, and firm-
wide levels. Voluntary reporting on detailed actions taken towards succession planning and 
increasing the number of women at all levels reveals differences between compliant 
platitudes and true commitment of resources towards the goal. The voluntary shift from 
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symbolic to substantive response allows real change to occur and embed, rather than remain 
at a superficial level (Sealy, Turner, Pryce & Vinnicombe, 2015). Self-regulation can be 
largely symbolic in order to dispel criticism (Arya & Salk, 2006); however, voluntary or 
mandated policies that do not include sanctions are less likely to work (Gray, 2015). The 
threat of quotas can motivate voluntary actions: in the UK thirty-four senior stakeholders 
express the need for continued external pressures on organizations to proactively increase 
female leadership (Vinnicombe et al., 2015). Since Kanter’s seminal work on tokens, liberal 
feminist researchers and demographers focus on improving numbers in order to change 
gendered cultures (Ely, 1994, 1995). Based on homophily and social identity theory, a 
“critical mass” of at least 33% of each gender shifts group dynamics, preventing mere 
compliance and ensuring substantive rather than symbolic change (Joecks, Pull & Vetter, 
2015; Kanter, 1977; Konrad, Kramer & Erkut, 2008). Gender is now widely accepted as 
socially constructed, suggesting that countries adopt quotas either “as a response to changing 
attitudes about women,” or in the hopes of doing so (Pande & Ford, 2012: 3). 
A final, related debate concerns whether quotas for outsider (i.e., external, non-
executive) or supervisory directorships are more symbolic than substantive. Context is key, as 
many European countries have a two-tier board system such that board quotas only affect 
outside directors. The UK and Australia’s unitary board systems’ new women directors are 
primarily outsiders (Davies, 2015). It is unclear whether new female supervisory directors 
can substantively impact their organizations’ cultures for all women employees. Initial 
progress from voluntary measures in Australia stalled and the Norwegian quota was not 
followed by an increase in female executives. The UK witnessed a small rise in female 
insider directorships, and a wave of publicly declared gender targets for top executives in 
large corporations and law firms. As leadership is created by and creates images (Fisher & 
15 
 
Fowler, 1995), the targets put women in these roles, leading society to deem the social 
identity of an all-male board as increasingly unacceptable and re-imaged.  
 
Legitimacy and the Adoption of Board Gender Quotas: Ethical Tensions 
Tensions concerning legitimacy arise in the emotional debates and responses of politicians, 
public opinion, media, shareholders, directors, and other stakeholders. From the literature, we 
identify three main concerns around the ethical and meritocratic nature of quotas, and the 
perception of individuals who are affected by quotas. 
 
Are quotas ethical? There are tensions among various ideological and ethical arguments for 
and against implementing quotas. Gender quotas symbolize equality, signify justice, reflect 
the value of equal representations of both sexes, and “stand for the current under-
representation of women and over-representation of men that is no longer considered normal” 
(Meier, 2013:462). Discrimination is a “pervasive and insidious phenomenon” (Oswick & 
Noon, 2014: 35) which organizations and countries have addressed for decades through laws, 
policies, and approaches for equal opportunities, diversity, and, more recently, inclusion. 
Despite popular rhetoric, the world is not meritocratic and systemic biases prevent equality of 
opportunity. Governments have considered various affirmative action (AA) policies since the 
1960s, and aim to correct imbalances “by adjusting the positive weighting of the majority 
group membership that is ingrained in the system” (Clayton & Tangri, 1989: 181). However, 
it is unclear as to whether AA actions are aimed at preventing unfairness or at compensating 
for previous injustices (Reskin, 1998). This tension is eloquently described in the case of the 
shackled runner (Noon, 2010): If after the race has started you realize that one runner is in 
shackles, do you stop the race and simply remove the shackles and tell the runners to 
continue, or do you bring the previously shackled runner up to the same level as the 
unshackled runner before continuing the race? 
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AA is paradoxical (Fullinwider, 1980) as it aims to prevent discrimination by utilizing 
discrimination. Women who are AA targets often reject the method of reducing inequality, 
not wanting to be identified as ‘special’ or treated differently (Heilman, McCullough & 
Gilbert, 1996). However, women’s initial scepticism disappears once they observe that more 
competent women are offered board appointments and post-quota female directors perceive 
the quota as “an imperfect strategy in an imperfect world,” but the right thing for Norway 
(Seierstad, 2015: 18). 
To be perceived as legitimate, an organization’s actions need to be seen as “desirable 
or appropriate” (Santana, 2012: 257), in the interests of a broad group of stakeholders 
(Freeman, Harrison & Wicks, 2007), and consistent with societal values (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978; Ruef & Scott, 1998). Institutional theory explains how actors seek legitimacy to 
survive (Suchman, 1995), and thus offers insights into how a previously considered 
illegitimate concept emerges, survives, and comes to be perceived as a legitimate institutional 
process (Smith et al., 2013). The quota process generally proceeds with a few key individuals 
claiming legitimacy for a radical process and using institutional pressures to normalize their 
claim. For example, Australian and British institutional authorities changed national 
governance codes— a significant step towards measurement and targets (Klettner et al., 2014; 
Sealy et al., 2015).  
Stakeholder theory investigates respective stakeholder groups’ legitimacy of claims, 
power, and urgency (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997; Jensen, 2002; Vasi & King, 2012), 
keeping in mind that social legitimacy is important for the institution of business (Wood, 
1991). When considering major corporate scandals of the past two decades (e.g., Enron, 
Arthur Anderson), there are “regimes of responsibility”— multiple stakeholders who failed to 
prevent these ethical violations (Goodstein & Wicks, 2007). Board homogeneity is also a 
systemic failure on the part of multiple stakeholders. For example, search firms collude in 
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anti-diversity practices with Chairs by using ambiguous and subjective assessments such as 
‘intrinsics’ and ‘fit’ rather than objective measures (Doldor, Sealy, & Vinnicombe, 
forthcoming). As Goodstein and Wicks (2007: 380) note about regimes of responsibility: 
“What is striking is that they got away with it for so long.” Certainly this is evident in the 
decades of low representation of women on boards in many countries. Failures can be solved 
by cooperation across stakeholders who generate novel, mutually beneficial solutions 
(Goodstein & Wicks, 2007), without resorting to legislation. Scholars such as Perrault (2015: 
1) suggest the importance of efforts to “decry the lack of legitimacy of homogenous (all-
male) boards”. However, as Goodpaster (2010: 741) states, “the pursuit of stakeholder 
satisfaction is not immune to moral critique” and different stakeholder groups are likely to 
have different voices on the legitimacy of such an intervention.  
 
Are quotas meritocratic? Whilst the ideology of meritocracy in careers and organizations is 
central to Western society (Son Hing, Bobocel, & Zanna, 2002), most director appointments 
are not purely talent-based (Sealy, 2010). A meritocratic class – often white, middle-class, 
middle-aged, educated men – perpetuate their privilege and power by defining merit 
(McNamee & Miller, 2004). True merit is only possible in a society with no biases (Son Hing 
et al., 2002).  
Women’s strong convictions for meritocracy shape their sense-making about careers 
(Sealy, 2010; Simpson, Ross-Smith, & Lewis, 2010; Seierstad, 2015). When workplace 
discrimination is obvious, people who strongly believe in meritocracy are less opposed to AA 
(Son Hing et al., 2002). Sealy’s (2010) study confirms these findings, with women reducing 
their opposition to quotas over time. Initial adherence to meritocracy is a gender-neutral 
principle; however, female directors use merit to support radical strategies and to justify 
women’s presence on post-quota boards (Seierstad, 2015). Companies that appear legitimate 
and meritocratic in the eyes of their stakeholders will gain acceptance and resources 
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(O’Connell et al., 2005; Meyer & Rowan, 1991). As both meritocracy and legitimacy are 
socially constructed (Ely, 1995; Harvey & Schaefer, 2001), some stakeholders’ claims were 
previously considered legitimate, but not today (Santana, 2012). That is, all-male boards were 
previously deemed normal and therefore natural; however, this gender imbalance is 
increasingly unacceptable in many countries. 
Deliberative democracy suggests that a process can only be legitimate if it is preceded 
by authentic involvement of decision-makers who have equal say (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). 
Each country’s pre-quota process is characterized by different decision makers’ involvement. 
In some cases, such as Spain, it is not clear that the pre-quota process sufficiently involves all 
decision-makers. British and Slovenian pre-quota negotiation processes involve many 
stakeholders. 
 
Are post-quota female directors perceived as legitimate? A third legitimacy tension concerns 
the perceptions of new female post-quota leaders by the women themselves and by other 
members of society. In terms of self-perception, post-quota female directors in Norway report 
feeling ‘legitimate’, possessing significant influence, sharing considerable information, and 
engaging in low levels of self-censorship (Elstad & Ladegård, 2010). Considering the 
discourse on board quotas in Swedish and Finnish media, Tienari et al. (2009: 513) quote 
post-quota female directors: “It doesn’t bother me one bit if they call me a quota woman”; 
another states “I agree… owners only want people they consider competent on their board.” 
Post-quota female directors report that they still have to prove themselves, but the calibre of 
the new women far exceeds the “mediocre men” they replace (Seierstad, 2015). In Sweden 
the post-gender political quota increase in female candidates’ competence, relative to male 
candidates is coined the crisis of the mediocre man (Besley, Folke, Persson, & Rickne, 2013).  
Others perceive the post-quota female directors as possessing high levels of education 
but less work experience. For example, evidence from Spain and Norway indicates that post-
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quota female directors are, compared to their pre-quota counterparts, considerably younger 
(Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Gonzalez Menéndez & Martinez González, 2012), have less CEO 
experience (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012), and less likely to be owners/partners or self-employed 
(Heidenreich, 2013). Post-quota female directors are more likely to have backgrounds in 
finance and economics (Gonzalez Menéndez & Martinez González, 2012) and higher levels 
of education, especially in law (Heidenreich, 2013) or general Masters qualifications 
(Gonzalez Menéndez & Martinez González, 2012). In France, pre-quota women directors 
establish their legitimacy through family ownership, elite educations, strong State ties, and 
top corporate careers (Singh, Point, Moulin, & Davila 2015). There is also evidence of 
French “figurehead” or celebrity directors such as a former tennis professional, former first 
lady Bernadette Chirac, and wives of major shareholders (Branson, 2012a). In terms of 
ethical considerations, Doh (2012) suggests that actions are legitimate as long as no one is 
made worse off; hence, the “mediocre man” is one group of stakeholders with grounds to 
question the legitimacy of quotas. 
Related research assesses non-quota countries’ female directors’ feelings around 
legitimacy. In the UK, new female directors report worrying about being “a token promotion” 
for their sex rather than for their ability, struggle with what they want to believe versus what 
they experience, and subsequently have lower perceptions of the legitimacy of the processes 
and their organizations (Sealy, 2010). Consistent with the findings reported above, UK 
female directors appear to require more qualifications in order to be perceived as legitimate: 
compared to their male peers, female directors are more likely to hold MBA degrees, and 
have substantially more multiple sector and international experience (Singh, Terjesen, & 
Vinnicombe, 2008). Search firms report that women director candidates are a ‘harder sell’ to 
the Chairs and that to be deemed legitimate, women directors need to have as many 
qualifications as possible, especially finance skills (Sealy & Doherty, 2012).  
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Perceptions of female directors’ legitimacy undoubtedly shifts once women comprise 
a critical mass [usually operationalized as three women directors on a board] (Konrad et al., 
2008; Torchia, Calabro, & Huse, 2011)] versus numbering as tokens (i.e., less than 15 
percent; Kanter, 1977). Once there is a more balanced board with a critical mass of women, 
women’s views are perceived as more legitimate, and a woman’s voice becomes that of just 
another individual, rather than a representative of an entire demographic group (Kanter, 
1977). 
 
Outcomes and the Adoption of Board Gender Quotas: Ethical Tensions 
Based on our review of over 25 papers examining outcomes, it is apparent that there is no 
consistent definition of quota success. We highlight debates around the definition of success, 
directors’ perceptions of their roles and identities, social capital, and gender balance. 
 
What is the definition of a successful quota outcome? One critical challenge involves 
measuring and defining success in academic research. Managers are typically evaluated based 
on their ability to maximize their firms’ long-term value (Jensen, 2002); however, academic 
research focuses more on short-term, quantifiable metrics than on longer-term, qualitative, 
and sometimes more ambiguous measures (Levinthal & March, 1993).  
A second challenge is the great ambiguity, across countries, about how to count 
progress towards quotas and targets. In Norway, the quota is clear: each company must meet 
the 40% target. In the UK, the 25% target for FTSE 100 companies is interpreted as an 
aggregate percentage across the largest 100 firms, consistent with historical FTSE reporting. 
The outcome is that whilst FTSE 100 female director representation increased from 12.5% to 
26.1% from 2011-2015, some firms have 50% female directors, and others reluctantly place a 
single woman on the board— 10% (BoardEx, 2015; Vinnicombe et al., 2015). 
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Board gender quota outcomes affect and are affected by a number of stakeholder 
groups including shareholders, current (pre-quota) and future (post-quota) directors, women 
in society, general public, local, national, and international politicians, search firms, industry 
associations, and the firms themselves. Stakeholders rarely agree on all issues and vary in 
power (Freeman, 1984) and desired outcomes — thus creating conflicting demands and 
outcome tensions. 
 Shareholders are often the most powerful set of stakeholders (Freeman, 1994). A 
growing literature examines the impact of quotas on financial and accounting performance, 
with mixed results. Panel analysis of 166 Norwegian public firms from 2001-2008 reveals a 
negative relationship between the post-quota appointment of female directors and firm value: 
a 10% increase in women directors is associated with a 12.4% decline in Tobin’s Q (Ahern & 
Dittmar, 2012). Immediately following the Norwegian quota announcement, stock prices 
drop, especially for firms with no female director (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012). For a short 
period after the Norwegian quota, only some Norwegian firms enjoy positive stock returns 
(Nygaard, 2011), revealing “the opinion of a portion of the market regarding the predicted 
effect of the measures announced” (Goplan & Watson, 2015: 11). Post-quota Norwegian 
firms’ comparatively lower short-term profits may be due to high labor costs and 
employment levels and fewer workplace reductions (Matsa & Miller, 2013). Other research 
finds no effects of post-quota female representation on return on assets or operating revenues 
and costs in Norway (Dale-Olsen, Schøne, & Verner, 2013). A recent meta-analysis of 
mostly pre-quota studies shows correlational evidence between increased board gender 
diversity and improved board performance (Post & Byron, 2015). However, few studies 
provide the direction of the correlations: more women directors may lead to some measure of 
better performance, or leaders of better performing companies favor board diversity (Adams, 
de Haan, Terjesen, & van Ees, 2015). 
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Shareholders and board members are also interested in post-quota board functioning, 
of which a growing number of studies generally report favorable responses. Following initial 
resistance to quotas, “boards just get on with business like before” (Teigen, 2010). Interviews 
with board members, board chairs, and election committee members indicate that post-quota 
boards are more professional and make better quality decisions (Bolsø, Bjørkhaug, & 
Sørensen, 2013). Post-quota female directors’ contributions vary based on board tasks (Huse, 
Nielsen, & Hagen, 2009). Post-quota boards with more women consider new perspectives 
and engage in more discussions (Heidenreich, 2013). These findings are generally consistent 
with growing evidence on the process-related benefits of board gender diversity (McKinsey, 
2008; Post & Byron, 2015; Terjesen et al., 2009) and women’s active roles enhancing human 
resource development, role models, and participative decision-making (McKinsey, 2008; 
Teigen, 2012b). 
 
How does the quota impact board directors’ perceptions of their roles? An individual may 
feel attached to multiple groups, with varying strengths of identification. Board directors 
identify with multiple roles and social groups (Hillman, Nicholson, & Shropshire, 2008; 
Withers, Corley, & Hillman, 2012). Female board members who do not comprise a “critical 
mass” do not identify strongly with the board (Jonsdottir et al., 2015). Taken together, social 
identity and tokenism theories explain why, in a pre-quota context, moving from zero women 
to one woman makes no difference to other women in the organization or to the overall 
culture. Once an intervention such as the quota begins to have an impact, the ‘dominant’ 
group’s influence wains and tokenism’s effects dissipate. The intended beneficiaries often 
object to AA or quotas (Kakabadse et al., 2015) — a great irony as one of the most common 
emotive arguments by women against quotas is “I don’t want to be a token woman,” and yet, 
by definition, tokenism does not occur when a quota is imposed because the gender split 
becomes more balanced and women cease to be seen as ‘other.’ After the Icelandic quota, 
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when women constitute at least 40% of a board, female directors are more likely to identify 
with the social role of board member (Jonsdottir, 2010).  
Once a quota is introduced, a woman may identify or be identified with a particular 
role based on when she joined the board, i.e., as a pre-quota director or a post-quota director. 
These identities can be subservient to others, e.g., as an expert in a particular industry. 
Comparing the social identity of pre- and post-crisis directors in Iceland, women added to 
mature, previously male-dominated boards are perceived to be “directors on approval” 
(Jonsdottir et al., 2015). On newly-formed post-crisis gender balanced boards in Iceland, 
there is “a cohort effect” with increased group cohesion and fewer gender differences in 
directors’ identification with their roles (Jonsdottir et al., 2015:1). Negative responses to new 
directors in Norway are not gendered; all new directors need to “earn” their roles (Dhir, 
2015)— suggesting that social identity can help explain outcomes when women join 
previously all-male boards. 
 
How do quotas impact social capital? Social capital theory describes the structural, 
relational, and cognitive capital that individuals obtain through networks and relationships 
which are closely tied with a firm’s organization, development, and strategy (Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998). From a structural perspective on individuals’ number and nature of 
relationships, post-quota female directors’ social capital increases almost twice as much as 
men’s – indicating that female directors serve as knowledge brokers across firms (Seierstad 
& Opsahl, 2011). This finding may be due to the fact that, for a short period immediately 
following the quota in Norway and Spain, several female directors held multiple directorships 
and thus were structurally embedded in multiple firms. In Norway, these women are known 
as “Golden Skirts” (Huse, 2013b, c). Post-quota, the number of male directors with multiple 
directorships also increases for a short period (Løyning, 2011; Seierstad & Opsahl, 2011; 
Heidenreich, 2013; Huse, 2012), a trend driven by the initially perceived limited pool of 
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female candidates (Teigen, 2012a). Post-quota boards retain the most powerful male directors 
with multiple directorships, while less experienced men are replaced by women directors 
(Teigen, 2015a). These findings suggest that post-quota female and male directors may be 
‘busier’ as they sit on multiple boards.  
Female directors’ extensive social capital may enable them subsequently to serve on 
many corporate boards in their career. By contrast, less powerful, pre-quota male directors 
may face less demand for their services as independent director appointments on quota-
affected firms, and instead pursue careers as directors on unaffected entities such as private 
firms, non-profits, and universities, thus developing bridging capital across disparate 
networks. Structurally, in Norway and Spain, post-quota female directors tend to occupy 
outsider directorships (Gonzalez Menéndez & Martinez González, 2012; Staubo, 2010; 
Bøhren & Staubo, 2015; Huse, 2013a), suggesting that women’s social networks are more 
likely to bridge across firms than to embed in one firm. Pre-quota efforts to increase women’s 
representation on boards were dominated by a number of failed structural capital initiatives 
(e.g., mentoring networks) (Huse, 2013a). Post-quota female outsider directors in Spain are 
more visible in the media than their male counterparts (de Anca & Gabaldon, 2014). 
The relational component of social capital concerns trust, norms, and expected 
obligations shared in relationships. Pre-quota board females are often embedded in family 
relationships, e.g., as the wife, sister, daughter, or other relative of the founder and/or owner. 
Spanish and French family-owned firms promote a higher share of female family members to 
their boards (Fagan & González Menéndez, 2012). Programs designed to help women land 
directorships such as Norway’s Female Future (NHO, 2013) organize training and events to 
increase participants’ relational capital (Håpsnes & Buvik, 2013). Icelandic evidence 
indicates that post-quota directors do not have relationships with directors before they join 
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boards (Arnardóttir & Sigurjonsson, 2015), and this lack of taint by association is considered 
imperative post-crisis (Jonsdottir, 2010).  
The third social capital component, cognitive, concerns how individuals or groups 
develop shared meaning and understanding, and is often only possible once structural 
mechanisms are embedded. In this regard, board members’ attitudes towards the quota 
become less negative over time (Arnardóttir & Sigurjónsson, 2015). 
 
Do gender quotas redress gender balance? In Norway, the quota produced the desired 
increase in female directors (6% in 2002; 12% in 2005; 18% in 2006; 36% in 2008; 40% in 
2009; Storvik & Teigen, 2010), and was accompanied by increases in female political 
leadership (Meier, 2013) but not improvements to the female positions at lower levels in 
corporations or the gender pay gap (Bertrand, Black, Jensen, & Lleras-Muney, 2014). 
Norway and Iceland are the only two countries to achieve the quota target [both 40%]; 
France’s CAC40 (33.2%), Spain’s IBEX 35 (19.1%), and Germany’s DAX (21.2%) are 
behind (BoardEx, 2015). 
Some countries’ (e.g., Sweden, Finland, UK) voluntary systems (i.e., comply or 
explain legislation) led to increases in women on boards. Cultural change is often assumed to 
be more likely through ‘voluntary’ measures rather than compulsion through law; however, 
there is no supporting evidence in the literature. Compared to quotas, voluntary measures 
make smaller and slower differences (Armstrong & Walby, 2012; Labelle, Francoeur & 
Lakhal, 2015).  
 
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
Our review allows us to offer a comprehensive set of suggestions for future research which 
we organize in terms of ethical tensions, theoretical perspectives, and research strategies 
(Table 2.)  
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---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
Ethical Tensions 
Motivations. We suggest researchers consider three perspectives around individuals’ 
motivations for quotas, implementation, and motivations for related initiatives such as 
voluntary targets.  
 
What motivates individuals to engage in quota debates and activism? We urge 
researchers to examine individual-level motivations to engage in quota debate and activism, 
leveraging multi-level lenses from stakeholder, institutional entrepreneur, schema, and social 
movement theories.  
One unexplored component of stakeholder and institutional theory concerns the role 
of institutional entrepreneurs— individual agents who create, initiate, or disrupt institutions 
(Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 2011; Pacheco, York, Dean & Sarasvathy, 2010; Wilmott, 
2010). Prominent institutional entrepreneurs leverage resources to “break with the rules and 
practices associated with the dominant institutional logics and practices” (Battilana, 2006: 
657), and can manage conflicting institutional logics to change the status quo (Smith, 
Besharov, Wessels & Chertok, 2012). There are many institutional entrepreneurs who 
championed the Norwegian quota including Trade Minister Gabrielsen and Gender Minister 
Valgerd Svarstad Haugland (Machold, 2013; Terjesen et al., 2015). In the UK, former 
minister Lord Davies personally cajoles individual CEOs and Chairs to balance their boards, 
and entrepreneurs such as Virgin founder Richard Branson now offer support for quotas 
(Branson, 2012b; Velkova, 2015). Furthermore, less obvious actors are involved in the 
change process and have varying motivations (Seierstad, 2015; Doldor et al., forthcoming). 
This raises a question regarding whether it is important what motivates the individual to 
change, as long as they make change happen? Who should the constellation of actors in 
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quotas include and how do they emerge? Recent research on activists indicates that these 
groups act differently (Eesley & Lenox, 2006), for example relying on tactics such as 
dragging firms “through the mud” in the media or utilizing lawsuits or proxy votes (Eesley, 
DeCelles, & Lenox, 2015). Certain institutional investors advocate strongly for certain 
personal interests; some shareholder activists pursue board gender diversity (Perrault, 2015). 
For example, Robert McCord of proxy advisory Glass Lewis votes against any firm that does 
not have an initiative to increase the women’s representation on the board, and the California 
State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) expresses dissatisfaction on social media if a 
company has an all-male board (Branson, 2012a). Activists tend to target large, visible 
consumer-oriented firms (King, 2008; King & Lenox, 2000). 
Individual-level research could examine individuals’ perspectives about justice, 
utility, and other philosophical views. With growing numbers of women in managerial 
positions, women’s social identity as potential leaders may grow stronger, raising the 
possibility that corresponding moral convictions may lead women to believe that they should 
hold more positions of power? Should we, therefore, expect more collective action on this 
issues, particularly in non-quota countries? Researchers may find schema theory- the 
organization of individuals’ patterns and thoughts (Piaget, 1926) to be useful in 
understanding what individual life experiences have activated certain worldviews. 
Individual-level motivations could be investigated using a broad range of data and 
methodologies such as ethnographies and computer-aided text analysis. For example, key 
individual and organizational actors’ editorial comments about the quota could be analysed to 
better understand the arguments. For example, entrepreneur Richard Branson (2012b: 1) 
argues, “By today's standards, we would find it unsettling if a jury were comprised of 12 
middle-aged white men. So why have so many business leaders been slow to take notice 
when women are absent from the boards of their companies?” Another potential strand of 
28 
 
research could use social network approaches to examine how individual actors (nodes) have 
relationships (ties) with others (see Scott, 2012) and build these over time, within and across 
firms and stakeholders. 
Social movement research utilizes a range of methodologies including in-depth 
interviews, archival studies, participant observation, single-case studies, comparative designs, 
life-history interviews, discourse analysis, simulations, network analysis, and studies of 
narratives (Klandermans & Staggenborg, 2002), all of which may be promising when 
examining both individual and group perspectives on involvement in the debate and activism 
of quotas. New developments in computer-aided text analysis (Pollach, 2012) can analyze 
texts. Theory and methodology choices ultimately rest with the selection of the specific 
research question.  
Taken together, we urge quota scholars to identify and utilize new sources of data that 
move beyond the current focus on secondary data (generally counts of directors), or a small 
set of interviews or surveys from one time period. Although scholars struggle to access elites 
(Feldman, Bell, & Berger, 2004), in-depth, qualitative studies offers tremendous insights into 
board processes. Researchers should seek out interesting groups such as the elite, member-
only, and somewhat secretive Belizean Grove and Today’s Already Rising Achievers 
(TARA) whose members are very influential in corporate and diplomatic sectors. Other data 
sources include parliamentary debates, press articles, and publications in influential social 
media such as blogs. 
 
What motivations affect the evolution of quota debate and implementation? Future 
research could examine what organizational motives shape the actual debate and 
implementation of quotas. For example, the ongoing EU debate about a potential quota across 
28 member states evolved from initial discussions for a mandate for all publicly-traded firms 
and a 40% quota for both inside and outside directors to a more ‘watered down’ code. 
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Political process theories consider “political opportunities”—that is, the complex 
environments in movements such as the quota as well as the role of “mobilizing structures” 
(established networks and organizations that help groups to mobilize) and “cultural framing” 
to understand social movements (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). This line of research 
could benefit from public choice theories which consider the aggregate of many private 
decision makers (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). Researchers might also consider emerging 
perspectives in stakeholder theory which focus on “total value” evaluations (Harrison & 
Wicks, 2013) thus shifting the conversation “away from performance outcome and back to 
variables that go into creating competitive advantage itself” (Husted & Allen, 2001: 5). This 
emerging theory suggests that social welfare is multi-dimensional and thus to create a good 
society, companies should have multiple objectives (Mitchell, Weaver, Agle, Bailey & 
Carlson, 2015).  
This line of research could take a comparative perspective, and examine how 
institutions in certain countries have shaped the dialogue. For example, with respect to the 
potential EU quotas, nineteen EU countries’ evidence gathering session at a European 
Commission (2012) meeting reveals the significant variety of institutional contexts in terms 
of women’s representation in the workforce, education levels, maternity rights, childcare 
provision, and cultural familial norms. Given that countries have differing institutional 
structures which affect gender roles, should the EU seek a potential ‘one-size-fits-all’ gender 
quota legislative framework? Sweden, Finland, Germany, and the UK initially opposed an 
EU quota, despite significantly different representations of women on boards (Sweden: 28%, 
Finland: 26%, Germany and UK: 10-15%). Future research could examine the evolution of 
multi-country negotiations and the roles of national institutions and leaders in the process. 
From a methodological standpoint, longitudinal research could track the evolution of 
the quota debates in parliaments and media outlets using qualitative analyses of panel data. 
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Future research might compare the development of the quota argument with earlier feminist 
initiates, such as suffrage or equal pay. Scholars could use discourse ethics (Gilbert & 
Rasche, 2007; Stansbury, 2009) to examine how various parties’ presuppositions are used to 
seek to establish normative or ethical truths. 
 
What factors motivate related initiatives such as voluntary targets, comply-or-explain 
legislation, or quotas for other groups? Future research could examine the motivations 
behind non-quota legislation, such as firms’ voluntary targets The term ‘targets’ is 
increasingly perceived as acceptable and even desirable; firms proudly announce targets as a 
mark of social responsibility. For example, UK Lloyds Banking Group has a 40% female 
target for the top 5,000 global senior managers by 2020. A related phenomenon are countries’ 
‘comply or explain’ policies which can often be found alongside a threat of legal sanctions or 
quotas (either from within the nation or supra-nationally) if these “voluntary” measures do 
not achieve required targets. For example, the UK’s Davies Report (2011: 2) clearly states 
that the “Government must reserve the right to introduce more prescriptive alternatives if the 
recommended business-led approach does not achieve significant change” [i.e., quotas if 
FTSE 100 companies do not meet the 25% target]. The tension around the term “voluntary 
measures” is apparent when the threat is perceived as real. The UK’s Secretary of State for 
Business recently described the quota as “a nuclear deterrent” and expressed hope that 
companies would “own this issue rather than have it imposed on them” (Roberts, 2014: 1). 
There is also the potential for board gender quotas to spillover to other minority groups (e.g., 
ethnic directors) and other arenas (e.g., private sector firms, universities). As another 
example, the UK’s Business Secretary now focuses on the proportions of minority ethnic 
directors. In other arenas, the UK’s proposed Athena Swan program will require universities 
to increase the number of women in leadership positions or face sanctions such as rejecting 
institutions’ applications for funding. Given that we know very little about the conditions 
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under which increasing diversity, at various organizational levels, ‘works’ (Guillaume, 
Dawson, Woods, Sacramento & West, 2013) or the mechanisms by which individual, work, 
or organizational outcomes are affected, should future research explore how quotas are 
diffused into other spheres of influence and other minority groups? 
This line of research could leverage a variety of theoretical perspectives. First, 
contagion theories, e.g. knowledge spillover, may explain how certain ideas of equality 
diffused across sectors (McFarland & Ployhart, 2015). Institutional theory and social network 
theory are also relevant. Lessons could be learned from corporate social responsibility 
theories, Scholars could use comparative studies, social media studies, multi-level 
approaches, and rich description approach to contextualization (Rousseau & Fried, 2001). 
 
Legitimacy. Our review suggests three promising directions around legitimacy concerning 
how organizations legitimize their responses to quotas, and the roles of government and other 
stakeholders in legitimizing quotas.  
 
How do organizations seek to legitimize their responses to quotas? Organizations initiate 
varied responses to quotas, but a common denominator is that they seek to legitimize their 
responses. Although stakeholder theory is sometimes criticized for focusing too much on 
shareholders and short-term impacts (Parmar, Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Purnell, & De 
Colle, 2010), and is a work in progress (Agle, Donaldson, Freeman, Jensen, Mitchell & 
Wood, 2008), we believe that this theory can help us understand longer term perspectives on 
how organizational responses to quotas seek to legitimize claims with various stakeholders. 
Given that firms that manage stakeholders, based on distributional, procedural, and 
interactional justice are more likely to acquire information and resources that can then satisfy 
these stakeholders (Harrison, Bosse, & Phillips, 2010), we might expect that firm responses 
consider the potential legitimacy. This ‘managing for stakeholders’ perspective should 
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explore stakeholder management behaviors around quotas and how organizations seek to 
establish legitimacy among certain stakeholder groups, and could involve action research or 
ethnographic approaches. 
Once stakeholders accept that the status quo regarding the under-utilization of female 
talent is sub-optimal, they face the question: Is an “evolutionary strategy” (i.e., voluntary 
measure) or “a single overarching vehicle” (i.e., quota) the best way forward for change 
(Dawkins, 2015: 21)? The recent focus on women on boards highlights asymmetries of power 
(Dawkins, 2015) and masculine hegemony (Lewis & Simpson, 2012) which lead to 
stakeholder exit (of women) who see no possible means of redress against what is perceived 
to be the natural order. If organizations do not want quotas, then they have a moral obligation 
to find alternative means by which to radically alter the status quo and allow more women, as 
stakeholders, to remain engaged. Building on Dawkins’ recent contributions to agonistic 
pluralism (2015: 21), stakeholders could ask: “What types of institutional changes are 
required, and what characterizes a new or ideal hegemony?” 
 
What role should government play in legitimizing quotas, particularly at a supra-
national level? Given current research that shows that gender quotas are neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient condition to achive a high number of women on boards, research could 
examine the role of government. Most social movements are characterized by organizations 
lobbying governments for change; however, in all fifteen quota countries, governments 
lobbied for change— formally with hard laws and informally with soft laws. Considering that 
complex, multi-level problems are more quickly solved through top-down than bottom-up 
approaches (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000) and the breadth of political actors (Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2007), it is possible that governments legitimately promote institutional/regulatory 
change to ensure marginalised voices are heard in corporate decision making in the future. 
Activists who attempt ‘action level’ change with a number of women’s initiatives may fall 
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into the “normativistic fallacy of ignoring the existing practical constraints imposed by the 
rules of the game” (Goodman & Arenas, 2015: 172). If it becomes apparent that ‘action level’ 
only leads to incremental rather than transformative change, should governments then take a 
‘constitutional level’ approach (Schreck, van Aaken & Donaldson, 2013)?  
Taking a discourse ethics approach, future research might consider the European 
Commission’s attempt to legislate an EU-wide quota. Quotas are usually seen as a coercive 
instrument (‘strategic action’, where influence is about coercion and power) and yet the 
normative process of the EU quota pursues a ‘communicative action’ approach “establishing 
moral norms by rational argumentation” (Goodman & Arenas, 2015: 169), taking into 
account multiple viewpoints of varying countries, to arrive at a norm acceptable to all. 
Analyzing the text of policy meetings, parliamentary debates and the consultation with social 
partners, research could explain: How do negotiations evolve within a country and/or across 
countries? How can the emerging theory of ‘corporate governance deviance’ (Aguilera, 
Judge, & Terjesen, 2015) be examined in a quota construct? 
 Given recent findings that Norway’s gender quota did little to improve the share of 
women in non-board top management roles and calls for future intervention (Teigen, 2015b), 
future research could examine: Do board quotas then legitimize further intervention at top 
management levels? To avoid quotas in the UK, governments set successful voluntary board 
diversity, and now senior level diversity targets are now considered legitimate across most of 
the largest banks and professional service firms. Diffusion theory could investigate how the 
boundaries of what is legitimate have shifted substantially in a short time frame. 
Research might also consider: How do non-quota country governments legitimize 
their non-intervention positions, particularly in the presence of other policies or statements 
that extol the virtues of diversity? Once the status quo is recognized as a sub-optimal market 
failure, intervention is considered a rational response (Mayhew, 2013). Acceptance of and 
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action on voluntary targets is likely to be based on strength of argumentation rather than 
incentives or the threat of punitive sanction (Goodman & Arenas, 2015). Such argumentation 
needs to educate, or else bounded ethicality (e.g., in the form of unconscious bias, or in-group 
favoritism, explained by social identity theory) will prevent any progress. Researchers may 
argue about whether there is value in setting targets or legislating soft quotas that they believe 
will not be implemented but Kim, Monge, and Strudler (2015: 341) argue that “normative 
theorizing should continue to set high ethical standards”. 
 
What role should other stakeholders play in legitimizing change and quotas? Social 
shareholder engagement (SSE) brings marginalized voices to corporate decision making. 
Shareholders make multiple demands on public firms (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007), such as 
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) responsibility; gender diversity is often 
included as a social concern. Non-financial ESG engagement has grown substantially with 
the discussion shifting from whether ESG investments make sense to how to achieve them 
(Eurosif, 2014).  
Media coverage of women director issues increased in the UK’s mainstream and 
business press (Davies, 2015), although the Davies report suggests that institutional 
investors—one of the stakeholder groups targeted by the original report– have not been 
sufficiently active in the change process. Does this shift in media reporting reflect or affect 
public perception of women on boards? Research in media coverage within or between 
multiple countries sheds some light on the change process. For example, Swedish media has 
increased its support for quotas. Future research could examine: Does the pace of change 
influence the media’s impatience for more progress and calls for quotas? Do institutional 
investors “have a moral obligation to work towards the empowerment and participation of all 
affected stakeholders” (Goodman &Arenas, 2015: 177) if stakeholders believe that business 
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exists to serve society rather than just for financially driven shareholders (Vinnicombe et al., 
2015)? 
Social movement theories (Morris, 1992) examining justification and outcomes for 
social, cultural, and political realms could consider the collective bargaining, relative sense of 
deprivation, and inequality highlighted by the media, political opportunity, and framing of the 
discussion. This repertoire of theories involves resource mobilization theories investigating 
why individuals protest when they do, and political process theories exploring how political 
arenas influence social movement trajectories (Klandermans & Staggenborg, 2002). Taken 
together, which main actors should push these changes— individuals, organizations, 
government, or society? What are the micro-processes that define their change agency? As 
noted above, bounded ethicality is a problem for many actors. However, what could we learn 
in studying those who manage to break through bounded ethicality and do the ‘right thing’ 
(Kim, et al., 2015)? 
Are more stakeholders involved in the change process in voluntary approaches rather 
than quota-led change? The success of the UK’s approach is often attributed to multiple 
stakeholders tasked by the 2011 Davies report (Vinnicombe et al., 2015)— that is, Chairs, 
CEOs, headhunters, regulatory bodies, and institutional investors. Australia’s Securities 
Exchange regulatory body was one of the first to introduce diversity reporting in 2010. Does 
having more stakeholders involve lead to more embedded cultural change? This could be 
monitored by measuring proportions of women at all organizational levels, culture surveys 
and qualitative data. 
Finally, various stakeholders engaged in this issue should reflect upon what their 
ultimate goals are and what sort of business/society is envisioned, e.g. 50/50 gender split? 
Fair representation of all identified minority groups? Stakeholders likely have differing views 
concerning which goals are legitimate goals and potential changes. For example, the UK’s 
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2011 Davies report set a ‘stretch target’ of 25% by 2015, and, having achieved this, extended 
the target to 33% by 2020. Headhunters and institutional investors suggest that targets should 
extend to Executive Committee levels (Davies, 2015). 
 
Outcomes. We also highlight three key questions around factors that affect quota success, 
quota impact on board functioning and processes, and career preferences. 
 
What factors affect the success of quotas? There is very little understanding of what factors 
affect the success of quotas. Relevant theoretical perspectives include institutional and status 
expectations theories.  
From an institutional theory perspective, despite the rich comparative corporate 
governance literature on institutional perspectives (e.g., Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; 
Aguilera & Jackson, 2003), only a handful of comparative studies of quotas explore national 
environment antecedents to the quota (Terjesen et al., 2015), female directors’ perceptions 
and experiences of Norway’s hard law and New Zealand’s soft law (Casey, Skibnes, & 
Pringle, 2011), differences in media coverage of quotas in Sweden and Finland (Tienari et al., 
2009), and elites’ perceptions of gender equality in Norway and Sweden (Teigen & 
Wängnerud, 2009). This research could be meaningfully extended by examining the extent to 
which distinct national institutional structures (i.e., gender equality, maternity leave, family 
policy) and the severity of sanctions (i.e., no director fees, de-listing) impact quota success 
across countries. Research efforts in countries with strong religious institutions such as Islam 
should consider the institution of religion jointly with culture and business (Syed & Van 
Buren, 2014). We caution that all comparative cross-country studies should be theoretically 
motivated in the choice of countries and strive to incorporate sample selection and data 
collection equivalence into research designs. Given the global nature of quotas, we urge 
scholars to pursue multi-country studies in collaboration with colleagues on the ground in 
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these countries, e.g., How is the Norwegian quota discussed in other countries’ media, 
government, and society? 
 Ethnographies involve field-based, multi-factorial, long-term observations which 
could yield new conclusions about quotas. We encourage researchers to look for 
opportunities such as observing how executive search firms conduct post-quota director 
searches or how boards debate issues in post-quota environments. 
 Although sometimes criticized for generalizability, a fast-growing stream of research 
utilizes experiments to examine how individuals of a particular gender benefit from 
favoritism and contribute to public goods (Mollerstrom, 2015). Experiments could help us to 
better understand public reactions to quota announcements and post-quota environments 
including unintended consequences and implicit biases. As mixed method approaches 
provide critical insights (Shah & Corley, 2006), quota researchers could combine social 
network analyses of board members with interviews, or ethnographies of board meetings 
together with firm performance data. These questions could be addressed using a range of 
data such as panel data. 
 
How do quotas impact board functioning and processes? We have very limited 
understanding of the effect of quotas on board functioning and processes. Key theoretical 
perspectives here include status expectations theory, human capital, fautlines, and social 
capital. 
Status expectations theory suggests that others infer expectations about an individual 
based on his/her diffuse status characteristics, e.g., gender, ethnicity, and education (Berger, 
Cohen, & Zeldich, 1972; Berger, Fisek, & Norman, 1977). Gender is particularly important 
as cultures routinely attach more respect and honor to men than to women (Berger et al., 
1977). Indeed, Schein’s (1975, 2007) “think manager, think male” describes how leadership 
behaviors are strongly believed to reflect male traits; furthermore women are frequently 
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assessed as having lower potential and less favorable evaluations of their performance 
compared to men (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Lyness & Heilman, 2006). This line of research 
could examine how expectations of post-quota board members are based on gender and other 
characteristics. 
While there is an abundance of social capital research, there is limited examination of 
inequality, particularly vertical structuring (Kwon & Adler, 2014). Social capital research on 
quotas tends to focus on structural aspects, as historically potential candidates needed to be 
‘known’ by the board of directors. The ‘old boy’s network’ was the de facto system. 
Structural work could be advanced by considering how social capital is activated, for 
example around the strength, reciprocity, and density of ties (e.g., Granovetter, 1973). 
Furthermore, the tensions around the motivations for quotas force closer consideration of 
social capital’s relational and cognitive elements, as simply increasing network (structural 
capital) does not necessarily lead to greater opportunity; subtle processes are at play (Sealy & 
Doherty, 2012). Concerning social capital’s cognitive dimension (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998) 
of shared narratives, languages, and codes, there is evidence that multinational corporations, 
even those headquartered in non-Anglo American countries, increasingly use English in 
boardrooms and therefore directors who are less comfortable in English (i.e., often older 
males) exit the boards (Piekkari, Oxelheim, & Randøy, 2015). Researchers could explore: 
How does the quota affect directors’ social networks and the language(s) spoken by the 
board?  
Social capital theory offers insights into how post-quota directors develop social 
networks before and after their appointments. Research could leverage Bourdieu’s (1993) 
notion of capital in the context of the social struggle to appropriate capital. Directors operate 
within a field (i.e., board, firm, industry, and business environment) and power relationships 
control flows of cultural, symbolic, and physical capital within and across fields. A potential 
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research question is: How do stakeholders develop and utilize power and legitimacy over 
time?  
Recent behavioral and experimental analyses of social capital (e.g., Andorfer & 
Liebe, 2013) can be extended to board research to examine how post-quota board directors 
develop social capital. Furthermore, recent commentary on the downsides of social capital 
(Portes, 2014) could be considered to explore the potential negative implications. 
Theories of human capital (Becker, 1975) suggest that education, training, and other 
investments can lead to positive career outcomes. Existing work analyzes post-quota 
directors’ human capital profiles but could go further to examine: How does human capital 
facilitate the development of social capital in post-quota environments? As boardroom 
heterogeneity enhances thought and perspectives, future research could examine: Are post-
quota women sufficiently different from their male colleagues to contribute cognitive 
diversity? 
Different types of faultlines (separation-, disparity-, variety-based) lead to different 
types of sub-groups (identity-, resource-, knowledge-based) that lead to different types of 
inter-subgroup processes (threat of identities, fragmentation, asymmetric perception of 
fairness, and centralization of power) (Lau & Murnighan, 1998). Post-quota boards’ faultlines 
around gender, age, experience, and other pertinent characteristics merit research on: How do 
faultlines shape identities and impact board functioning? 
 Resource dependency theory suggests that boards nominate directors whose 
competencies fill firm needs (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000). Quotas inevitably lead 
firms to shed some male directors— unless appointing a large number of new females to the 
existing board is an option— and thus merit investigations such as: How do quota-affected 
firms manage resources in this changing board context?  
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 The quota is “an effort to achieve and maintain [gender] balance” (Rosenblum, 2009: 
85) that sometimes results in situations where men become tokens. For example, in 2009 in 
Iceland, the post-crisis, pre-quota bank boards reinstated by the government were 60, 80, and 
100% female (Jonsdottir et al., 2015). The new Icelandic quota then limited each gender to 
60%; boards with 80% and 100% women had to replace some females with males or add new 
male directors. As men have less negative experiences as tokens (Chatman & O’Reilly, 
2004), future research could examine how post-quota men experience tokenism. 
 Despite early counts of women’s presence on board committees (Bilimoria & Piderit, 
1994; Kesner, 1988), there is no examination of post-quota women’s presence on important 
committees such as nomination and remuneration. This line of research would extend the pre-
quota research on women directors’ strategic contributions to boards (Nielsen & Huse, 2010). 
 Other unaddressed phenomena include the worldwide debate surrounding potential 
director tenure limits and the maximum number of board positions a person may hold at any 
one time. Tenure may compromise the outsider directors’ independence; multiple directors 
may comprise quality to their organizations. Several Western economies’ corporate 
governance guidance rules incorporate limits on director tenure or other directorships. For 
example, stakeholder activists in the UK and Australia are pushing for director tenure caps of 
9-12 years; and in the UK less than 2% of FTSE 100 directors sit on more than two FTSE 
boards (Vinnicombe et al., 2015). There is, however, little agreement across countries as to a 
‘best’ recommendation. Further legislation would ‘churn’ the demand of directorships, 
creating opportunities to increase the pool of directors. Future research could examine: How 
do voluntary or mandatory tenure requirements affect the profiles of post-quota directors’ 
selection on boards and their subsequent careers within and across boards? Does the debate 
on director tenure draw on arguments for gender quotas? How might limits on board 
directorships affect quota implementation? 
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The mature stream of research tracking the number of female directors incorporates 
historical developments and statements from leading advocates on all sides of the debate 
(e.g., Bourez’s 2005 census of female directors across Europe and Catalyst reports); however, 
there are few multi-year studies of quotas. Longitudinal investigations are possible, 
particularly given quotas’ multi-year [3-5 year] time horizon from initiation to 
implementation and the availability of panel data through BoardEx and other sources. Time 
lags offer potentially more robust tests of causality from pre- to post-quota, controlling for 
other factors. Furthermore, longitudinal data can consider contextual issues such as changes 
in corporate governance legislation or economic crises. Future researchers should include the 
multiple dates of debates, milestones, and actions to capture changing discourse and 
progress.We echo calls for more integrative theory and evidence concerning how greater 
diversity at multiple levels impacts organizational outcomes (e.g., Guillaume et al., 2013) in 
the quota context. Existing quota research often identifies the importance of context at 
multiple levels, but does not incorporate multi-level observations or theorizing. Future 
research could examine, in tandem, individual experiences, board processes, firm strategies, 
industry environments, and country-level corporate governance bundles.  
 
Does a quota affect how women at varying stages consider potential careers, including 
board appointments? Key theoretical perspectives here include tournament theory, 
expectancy theory, glass cliff theory, resource dependency.  
Quotas drive demand for top level talent which may influence women’s perceptions 
of career outcomes, meriting joint consideration of expectancy and tournament theories. 
Vroom’s (1964) expectancy theory describes how an individual will undertake activities that 
he/she perceives will result in positive outcomes. An individual’s sense of ‘fit’ to an 
organization is also important: women and men who perceive lower fit are less likely to 
identify with the organization and have ambitions for their careers in the organization, and 
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are more likely to psychologically exit (Peters & Ryan, 2010; Peters, Ryan, & Haslam, 2014). 
Tournament models suggests that expected payoffs increase players’ willingness to continue 
to participate in multiple ‘tournaments’ in one’s career and move up the hierarchy, and 
largely neglect gender (Connelly, Tihanyi, Crook, & Gangloff, 2014). Board gender quotas 
suggest larger potential career success payouts for females in managerial careers, and may 
motivate women to continue to move up the pipeline. Future research could investigate: Does 
a quota fundamentally change how women at varying career stages consider potential careers, 
including board appointments? What ethical dilemmas do women experience while pursuing 
the tournament to the top of firms? 
Early research in the professional services industry indicates that women’s gender 
identity is affected by the numbers of women in senior positions within their organization 
(Ely, 1994; 1995). This work could be extended to consider: Does the number of female 
directors influence women’s gender identities? As most quotas affect only 
supervisory/outsider directors with limited day-to-day contact with employees, would 
increasing the number of female inside directors have a greater impact? Recent work 
describes how moral convictions that are embedded in relevant social identity predict 
collective action to achieve social change (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2012). 
However, most countries’ quota efforts were not driven by collective action. Will the 
growing numbers of women in the workforce, including at managerial levels, increase 
women’s social identities as managers and moral convictions that women should hold more 
positions of power? If so, can we expect more collective action on this issue, including in 
non-quota countries? In arguing for agonistic pluralism in stakeholder relations, Dawkins 
(2015:9) proposes collective action as a mechanism to allow stakeholders to protect their 
interests, “consistent with human dignity and procedural and distributive justice”. In some 
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Western economies, a dominant culture of individualism constrains the acceptability of 
collective action.  
Theorizing on identity and business ethics within organizations is being extended by 
new work showing that individuals’ moral identification with organizations affects employee 
attraction, motivation, and retention (May, Chang & Shao, 2015). These important new 
findings on values-based decision-making could address the idea that women who do not 
morally identify with these roles will not put themselves forward for the most senior roles. 
Another recent study finds that individuals are more attracted to organizations based on 
beliefs about the moral and ethical behavior of teams and organizations than perceptions of 
competence (Van Prooijen and Ellemers, 2015). Employees’ moral identification might be 
driven by their perceptions of the organization’s moral development. Previous decades of 
scholarship on corporate social responsibility reporting can inform diversity reporting. 
Governance reporting “allows corporations to effectively escape stricter regulation” (Hess, 
2008: 448) which may drive quicker behavioral changes— the ultimate goal. Moral 
development is possible when organizations report data externally, and use the data internally 
to challenge assumptions and embed real actions with respect to operations and strategy. If 
the reporting is only a response to external pressure or a publicity exercise, this decoupling 
will be apparent to the organization’s internal members, and moral identification will not 
occur. Research can combine governance reporting and social identity to investigate: How 
does an organization’s public stance on boardroom gender diversity affect employees’ social 
identity? Does detailed diversity reporting enhance female employees’ moral identification? 
This line of thinking could consider individuals’ bounded self-interest (Bosse & Phillips, 
2015). 
Women on boards research rarely addresses issues of intersectionality. Researchers 
must acknowledge that the women in this discussion come primarily from privileged white, 
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middle-class, and educated backgrounds (Atewologun & Sealy, 2014). How do women (and 
men) of color fit into this discussion? What are the most salient aspects of individuals’ 
‘privileged’ identities (seniority, gender, ethnicity) that help or hinder their paths to the 
boardroom? 
The ‘glass cliff’ theory (Ryan & Haslam, 2007) suggests that women are often 
appointed to precarious leadership positions. Board service is less attractive due to longer 
hours, higher reputational risk, and greater liability concerns (Barnard, 2006). Critical 
research questions include: Do women face a rank injustice in being intentionally or 
inadvertently placed in post-quota ‘glass cliff’ positions? The organizational ‘fall guy’ 
problem has already been dealt with in organizational ethics program guidelines that state 
that the person must be an executive, and can be leveraged for quota research. We encourage 
future researchers to investigate multiple theories in parallel to identify the most useful 
lens— a technique known as theory pruning (Leavitt, Mitchell, & Peterson, 2010). 
 
CONCLUSION 
Corporate board gender quotas raise ethical concerns that are both driven by and affect 
multiple sets of actors, organizations, and governments. Quota research has reached a state of 
maturity such that it is possible to describe the tensions and ethical dilemmas in terms of 
motivations, legitimacy, and outcomes, highlighting the frequency and variability of these 
dilemmas and then offer insights from current theoretical perspectives. We have attempted to 
rationalize the often emotive discussions on corporate board quotas by questioning and 
reconceptualizing everyday constructs such as meritocracy and legitimacy, and reconsidering 
the definition of ‘successful’ outcomes of quotas and other affirmative action measures. 
Extant studies attempt to explain quotas through a particular theoretical framework which we 
view as incomplete. We offer a deeper understanding through overlapping four different 
perspectives. As quotas are a multi-level phenomenon, we strongly advise future researchers 
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to take a more integrative approach – for example, combining multiple theories and data. Our 
hope is that this review consolidates existing knowledge for scholars, policymakers, and 
practitioners, and inspires future research. 
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Table 1: Conflicting tensions concerning board quota quotas 
 
Motivation Tensions: Tensions that emerge from the underlying rationale for the quota 
Are quotas motivated by a desire for justice or utility? 
 Both utility and justice arguments are used by both quota supporters and opponents: supporters use utility to argue that 
quotas effectively leverage female talent and justice for equal gender representation; opponents use utility to argue that 
firms should be free to select the most qualified individual and justice to argue that this individual should have an 
opportunity to serve on the board, regardless of gender. 
 The organizational ‘business case’ rests on talent management, creativity, innovation, decision- making, risk, 
stakeholder relationships, customers, and/or financial performance; however evidence is mixed for all these criteria. 
 Ethical tensions consider costs to organizations relative to benefits for society and firms.  
 The competing logics of government institutional structures are apparent in business versus equalities departments.  
What institutional structures motivate quotas? 
 Quotas spread from political spheres to state-owned and private spheres (e.g., corporate boards) 
 Countries with quotas tend to have policies to support female participation in the labor market, left-leaning political 
coalitions, and prior gender equality initiatives in public policy and in corporate governance; and mixed-market or 
coordinated market economies and Scandinavian or French legal systems  
 Quota supporters draw on the institutional structure of a national identity of egalitarianism. 
 Institutional manifestations of gendered work are driven by homophily: individuals recruit similar others to boards. 
Are efforts to add women to the board motivated by considerations of integrity or 
compliance? 
 Quotas can be motivated by symbolic or substantive responses; the former may evolve into the latter.  
 Pre-quota normative pressures in Norway (e.g., networks, mentoring, training, databases) failed to work. Coercive 
“threat of quota” pressures increase the shares of women on boards in some countries. 
 When facing a quota, organizations can acquiesce, comply, defy, avoid or manipulate the quota.  
 The tensions of integrity versus compliance are driven by the intended outcomes.  
 Quota threat may effect change without quotas; quotas without sanctions effect little change 
Legitimacy Tensions: Tensions that emerge from the emotional debates and responses of 
politicians, public opinion, media, shareholders, directors, and other stakeholders 
Are quotas ethical? 
 Quotas can symbolize both inequality and equality in a national context; affirmative action (AA) policies may aim to 
prevent unfairness or to compensate for previous injustices, but utilize discrimination.  
 The tension is evident in the shackled runner debate.  
 Quota targets (i.e., women) often reject quotas due to not want to be perceived as special. 
 To be deemed ethical, quotas must be perceived as legitimate via alignment with societal norms and values; however, 
this process often occurs in reverse order for quotas: some individuals claim legitimacy and use radical processes to 
normalize their claim. 
 Multiple stakeholders (regimes of responsibility) fail to prevent ethical violations; it is not always clear which 
stakeholders are responsible for homogeneous boards and thus who should legitimately be involved in ‘fixing’ the 
problem. 
Are quotas meritocratic? 
 Meritocracy is socially constructed by the current ruling class. 
 People who believe in meritocracy are less opposed to AA, including quotas. 
 Today’s standards for legitimacy may not be considered acceptable in the future. 
Are post-quota female directors perceived as legitimate? 
 Post-quota female directors perceive themselves as legitimate; others often view post-quota female directors as 
legitimate with respect to their significant education qualifications; female directors in non-quota countries worry 
about being perceived as a “token promotion” and candidates for directorships are urged to have many qualifications.  
 Post-quota female directors’ legitimacy may lead to the crisis of the ‘mediocre man’ who is negatively affected. 
 Women’s views are not heard or deemed legitimate until a ‘critical mass’ (usually three women on a board) is reached. 
Outcome Tensions: Tensions that emerge from defining a successful outcome 
What is the definition of a successful quota outcome? 
 Researchers focus on short-term, quantifiable metrics, rather than long-term, qualitative, more ambiguous, and 
ultimately more meaningful measures. 
 There is considerable ambiguity around how to count progress towards quotas and targets: individual or index. 
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 Quotas affect and are affected by a number of stakeholder groups who rarely agree on desired outcomes. 
 For shareholders, financial outcomes are inconclusive, and causality directions are unknown. 
 Post-quota boards have higher levels of functioning: leveraging new perspectives and engaging more discussion.  
How does the quota impact board directors’ perceptions of their roles? 
 Pre-quota female directors experience tokenism and do not identify strongly with boards. 
 Post-quota female directors are more likely to identify with the social role of board member. 
 Female directors’ identities as ‘pre-quota’ or ‘post-quota’ are subservient to others, i.e., as an industry expert. 
How do quotas impact social capital? 
 Post-quota multiple directorships increase for both women (e.g., “Golden Skirts”) and men. Post-quota women 
directors’ social capital increases at twice the rate of men’s; post-quota female directors are more visible in the media. 
 Post-quota females are mostly outsider directors, suggesting bridging social networks across firms versus one firm. 
 Relational social capital is evident in that post-quota boards often include female family members. 
 Efforts to increase the number of female board members often seek to build social capital among participants. 
 In an economic crisis situation (i.e., Iceland), it is important for new post-quota directors not to have any relationship 
with pre-quota board members who are widely considered to have steered the firms into the crisis. 
 All board members’ attitudes towards quotas (i.e., cognitive capital) become less negative over time.  
Do gender quotas redress gender balance? 
 The quota produces the desired increase in female directors in some countries but not in all countries. 
 Tensions and contradictions in many countries are apparent between wanting gender balance but not wanting to 
implement quotas and instead preferring voluntary measures. 
 Quotas may not eliminate discrimination; however, over time, women directors are viewed as business as usual. 
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Table 2: Future research directions  
 
Ethical Tensions Relevant Theoretical Perspectives Research Strategies 
Motivations 
What motivates individuals to 
engage in quota debates and 
activism? 
Institutional theory, social identity 
theory, social movement theory, 
organizational justice theory, 
schema theory, social exchange 
theory 
Longitudinal data, ethnography, 
computer-aided text analysis, discourse 
analysis, interviews, case studies, 
network analysis, career narratives 
What motivations affect the 
evolution of quota debate and 
implementation? 
Political process theory, social 
movement theory, network theory, 
public choice theory, stakeholder 
theory, institutional theory 
Archival studies, longitudinal data, 
international comparative perspectives, 
qualitative analysis of panel data, 
discourse ethics 
What factors motivate related 
initiatives such as voluntary 
targets, comply-or-explain 
legislation, or quotas in other 
groups? 
Knowledge spillover theory, 
corporate social responsibility 
theories, social contagion theory, 
institutional theory, social network 
theory  
Social media studies, comparative 
studies, multi-level approaches, rich 
description approach to 
contextualization 
Legitimacy 
How do organizations seek to 
legitimize their responses to 
quotas? 
Stakeholder theory, justice theories, 
resource theory, corporate 
governance deviance 
Multi-level data, qualitative 
approaches, triangulate stakeholder 
findings, action research, ethnography 
What role should governments 
play in legitimizing quotas, 
particularly at supra-national 
level?  
Diffusion theory, deliberative 
democracy, normative business 
ethics theory, social identity theory, 
institutional theory 
Multi-level theorizing, discourse 
ethics, dialogic approaches, analyses of 
policy documentation 
What role should other 
stakeholders play in 
legitimizing change and quotas? 
 
Social movement theory, political 
process theory, stakeholder theory 
Discourse ethics, culture surveys, 
analysis of media coverage, analysis of 
micro-processes of change 
Outcomes 
What factors affect the success 
of quotas? 
Status expectations theory, 
institutional theory 
Panel data, international comparative 
studies, discourse analysis of media 
coverage 
How do quotas impact board 
functioning and processes? 
Status expectations theory, human 
capital, faultlines, social capital, 
social identity theory, tokenism, 
resource dependency theory 
Quasi-experimental, qualitative social 
capital analysis, power-base analysis, 
behavioral and experimental analyses, 
career narratives, CV analysis, 
longitudinal, time-lag data, 
contextualisation (legislative and 
economic), discourse analysis, multi-
level observations 
Does a quota affect how women 
at varying career stages 
consider potential careers, 
including board appointments? 
Tournament theory, expectancy 
theory, glass cliff theory, resource 
dependency, social contagion 
theory, identity-fit theory of 
motivation, social identity theory, 
values-based decision making 
theory, CSR theories 
Comparative cross-country analyses, 
career narrative interviews, focus 
groups, career motivation surveys 
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APPENDIX A 
Countries with Board Gender Quotas 
Countries with Gender Quotas 
Country Quota PTFs SOEs Passage Date Compliance 
date 
Sanctions 
Norway 40% Yes Yes December 19, 
2003 
2006: SOEs; 
2008: PTFs 
(40%) 
Refuse to register board; dissolve 
company; fines until compliance 
Spain 40% Yes  No March 22, 2007 March 1, 2015: 
PTFs (40%) with 
250+ employees 
Lack of gender diversity will impact 
consideration for public subsidies and 
state contracts 
Finland 40% No Yes April 15, 2005 June 1, 2005 None 
Québec 
(Canada) 
50% No Yes December 1, 
2006 
December 14, 
2011 
None 
Israel 50%/ 
1FBD  
Yes Yes March 11, 
2007: SOEs; 
April 19, 1999: 
PTFs 
2010: SOEs; 
None for PTFs 
None 
Iceland 40% Yes Yes March 4, 2010 September 1, 
2013: 40% for 
firms with 50+ 
employees 
None 
Kenya 33% No Yes August 28, 
2010 
August 28, 2010 None 
France 40% Yes No January 13, 
2011 
January 1, 2017: 
500+ employees 
or €50m 
revenues 
Fees will not be paid to directors 
Malaysia 30% Yes No June 27, 2011 2016:  
250+ employees 
None 
Italy 33% Yes No June 28, 2011 Interim 20% by 
2012 
Fines; directors lose office 
Belgium 33% Yes Yes June 30, 2011 2011-2: SOEs; 
2017-8: PTFs 
Void the appointment of any directors 
who do not conform to board quota 
targets; suspend director benefits 
UAE 1FBD Yes Yes December, 2012 Not specified None 
India 1FBD* Yes Yes August, 2013 August 1, 2015 Fines 
Greenland 
(Denmark) 
50% Yes Yes 2013 January 2014  
Germany 30%** Yes  December, 2014 2016 Director seat must be left vacant 
Note: Updated from Terjesen, Aguilera, and Lorenz (2015); * At least one woman director is required to be on 
the board for publicly traded and every other public company (paid-up share capital > 100 crore rupees or 
turnover of > 300 crore rupees) (August 2013); ** Applies to supervisory boards only; PTFs = publicly traded 
firms; SOEs = state-owned enterprises. Countries with ‘comply or explain’ legislation for certain sets of firms 
include Sweden, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, Nigeria, Malaysia, South Africa, Denmark, 
Austria, the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, Australia, Turkey, Switzerland, and the United States. 
